Introduction

Asignifying Semiotics as Proto-Theory of Singularity:
Drawing is Not Writing and Architecture does Not Speak
Deborah Hauptmann and Andrej Radman, editors

But where does the idea that the socius is reducible to the facts of language, and that these facts are in turn reducible to linearizable and ‘digitalizable’ signifying chains, come from? (Guattari, 1986)

To start on a personal note, we have recently witnessed a confession of a fellow architect with which we fully identify. We, too, belong to the generation educated under the semiotic regime, which – as we will argue in our introduction – has run its course. We also believe that the idea of ‘architecture as language’ might have been useful as an analytical tool but never as a design mechanism. After all, creativity comes first and routinisation follows. As the title of Footprint 14 suggests, this is a general plea to have done with the hegemony of the linguistic signifier. Signifying semiotics is but a fraction of a much broader asignifying semiotics. We propose to approach the issue qua a Spinozist practice of ethology, defined as the study of capacities, or – as we would like to think of it – a proto-theory of singularity. This is as much an ethical or political problem as it is an aesthetic one. It concerns what the cultural critic Steven Shaviro recently qualified as a primordial form of sentience that is non-intentional, non-correlational, and anoetic. The Affective Turn will be measured against the unavoidable Digital Turn. We will conclude by reversing the famous Wittgensteinian dictum whereby what we cannot speak about we must not pass over in silence. In the final paragraph of a politically charged epilogue, we reveal the pink-on-pink reference.

Discarding the Hegemony of the Linguistic Signifier

Gilles Deleuze famously credits Charles Saunders Peirce with propagating the asignifying sign, which is not formed linguistically, but aesthetically and pragmatically ‘as a condition, anterior by right to what it conditions’. Félix Guattari draws the line between those who relate semiotics to the science of language à la Ferdinand de Saussure, and those who consider language as merely one of many instances of general semiotics. Semiotics, particularly in Europe, has generally followed de Saussure’s lead and paid more attention to ‘cultural’ than ‘natural’ signs. The move in the post-war period towards what Jacques Derrida simply called ‘grammatology’ was marked by increasingly urgent meditations on writing. Roland Barthes, a crucial contributor to the debate on semiotics, heralds the crossing of the Atlantic of this French intellectual discourse with his 1967 essay ‘The Death of the Author’, first published in America. Here, the removal of authority from the author turned scriptor, paralleling Julia Kristeva’s concept of intertextuality, impacted architectural theory in America in a profound way.

The contribution in this issue by Stella Barakianou, ‘Moiré Effect: Index and the Digital Image’, identifies in Barthes’ analysis of the image ‘a point where signification resists meaning, the index becomes void, and [...] meaning is produced through the failure of language’. In his article entitled ‘Information and Asignification’, Gary Genosko,
through a nuanced reading of Guattari and Barthes, clearly articulates the difference between asignifying semiotics and signifying semiologies, while pointing to Barthes’ disavowal of ideology with respect to his concept ‘de-politicized speech’.

On the other hand, semiotics in the American context has provided the basis for a far more general enterprise, and a means of unifying the sciences of physics, biology and psychology. Peirce, the champion of general semiotics, treats it as a process. His signs are modes of sensation: the affect. In its appeal to common sense, representationalism or indirect realism is inherently conservative. It could be argued that its sole task is to tame and domesticate difference; that is, to make it subordinate to identity. By contrast, if we treat identity as a derivative and not as a foundational concept, we effectively denounce phenomenology for elevating recognition and resemblance to the status of a basis of thought.

The relative autonomy of the asignifying sign is paramount if we are to define a body neither by its form, nor by its organs or functions, but by its capacity for affecting and being affected in return. Deleuze provides an example which at first seems counterintuitive and proves just how much we are accustomed to Aristotelian categorisation. There are greater differences between a racehorse and a workhorse than there are between an ox and a workhorse. This is because the racehorse and the workhorse do not share the same affects or the same capacity for being affected: the workhorse has more affects in common with the ox. Things are no longer defined by a qualitative essence, ‘man as a reasonable animal’, but by a quantifiable power. The limit of something is the limit of its action and not the outline of its figure.

In his contribution to this issue, ‘Video Assemblages: “Machinic Animism” and “Asignifying Semiotics” in the Work of Melitopoulos and Lazzarato’, Jay Hetrick also calls on this thought model made so clear by the image of the racehorse and the ox. In developing his argument on asignifying semiotics through an analysis of Assemblage (Angela Melitopoulos’ 2010 video installation co-created with Maurizio Lazzarato), Hetrick identifies the ‘machinic’ quality of the assemblage firstly in its ‘functional and pragmatic’ capacity to affect and be affected. This assemblage, much like the body in Spinoza, is developed in terms of ‘machinic animism’. The assemblage is further identified in terms of an ‘axiomatic set’; one which, following William James, can be seen as a ‘conjunctive and disjunctive’ set of relations.

A Spinozist Practice of Ethology
Central to Gregory Seigworth’s contribution is the work of François Laruelle, to whom, he points out, Deleuze and Guattari nod their heads in their final book What is Philosophy?. Seigworth’s understanding of the ‘non-’ (non-philosophy, non-science, non-thinking…) neither indicates a negation nor an opposition, but a relationship that configures and reconfigures both immanent and affective relations along the axis referred to as ‘body-mind-world’. Barakianou also points to Laruelle in her article. Here, Laurelle’s ‘non-photography’ is cited to indicate the capacity of photography to carry out reflexive operations. Barakianou writes of Laurelle’s ‘theory of doublets, a coupling of duality and unity, the theory of one-to-one’. This one-to-one, as Seigworth discusses it, is, for Laurelle, not the Spinozist ‘One-All’ but must be seen ‘[…] in the absolute singularity and solitude of the ordinary or generic human’. What is at stake here is no less than the materiality/incorporeality of the ‘real’. Citing Seigworth: ‘For Laurelle, the matter-ing/motor-ing of immanence provides an absolute stillness, a dense point of the tightest, most contracted infinity. For Deleuze and Guattari, the matter/motor of immanence turns an infinite process, an all-at-once absolute expanse of survey without distance.’
Hybridising Real Virtual and the Actualised through Affective Medium Ecology', Marc Boumeester, through a complex series of relational arguments, builds a compelling case for thinking of asignification in terms of ‘medium’ as opposed to ‘media’. Through notions akin to desire, yearning and unfulfilled-ness, Boumeester develops a double movement between information and sensation or, in line with Deleuze, what he identifies as the virtual and the sublime. On the other hand, in his ‘The Birthing of Things: Bergson as a Reader of Lucretius’, Patrick Healy examines the work of Henri Bergson on Lucretius and argues for its vital significance in understanding the development of Bergson’s philosophy of the virtual best, exemplified in the statement ‘the whole is never given’.

Gibson’s assertion that amodal (and ambulant) perception is a rule rather than an exception, parallels Deleuze’s argument that every perception is, in fact, hallucinatory because it has no object. In the words of the radical empiricist William James: ‘We were virtual knowers […] long before we were certified to have been actual knowers […]’. If perception is, *ipsa facto*, virtual, the Part to Whole relationship simply makes no sense. We need to supplant it with the relationship of Ordinary vs. Remarkable (Singular). The optical form does not remain invariant, but the form of the change of form is an invariant. A perceived event (whole) is not based on a static property such as form (part), but rather upon an invariant embedded in change (singularity). As Henri Bergson would have it, while parts are always in space, the (open) whole is in time. It comes as no surprise that Gibson turned his attention to (formless) invariants:

In his contribution, ‘Medium Affect Desire:
them as changes of structure rather than changes of position of elementary bodies, changes in form, rather than of point locations, or changes in the layout rather than motions in the usual meaning of the term.  

Digital Turn

As we see it, the problem with the predominant (i.e. linguistic) conceptions of experience is not that they are too abstract, but rather that they are not abstract enough. We seem to be lacking a genuine theory of the concrete abstractness of experience. As the process philosopher Albert North Whitehead cautions, a fact in nature has nothing to do with the logical derivation of concepts. It is therefore high time to shake off the pernicious residue of the Linguistic Turn. In the words of the late architectural theorist Robin Evans: ‘Drawing is not writing and architecture does not speak.’ As Gibson aptly said, one cannot hope to understand natural stimuli by analogy with socially coded stimuli:

The world does not speak to the observer. Animals and humans communicate with cries, gestures, speech, pictures, writing, and television [and internet], but we cannot hope to understand perception in terms of these channels; it is quite the other way around. Words and pictures convey information, carry it, or transmit it, but the information in the sea of energy around each of us, luminous or mechanical or chemical energy, is not conveyed. It is simply there. The assumption that information can be transmitted and the assumption that it can be stored are appropriate for the theory of communication, not for the theory of perception.

To try to capture the non-discursive (eventful) through what is, in terms of evolution, either a fairly recent graft of linguistic theories, or the more current input/output information processing, is certainly appealing. Yet it is impossible, not least because there is no structural homology between the (continuous) analogue and the (discrete) digital. Strictly speaking, there are no digital events in nature. Zeno’s paradox continues to haunt us. This is especially pertinent as we seem to be witnessing yet another major ‘paradigm shift’– the Digital Turn.

This issue opens with a contribution by Genosko, which lays out the trajectory of thinking that first challenges the importance of ‘meaning’ in semantic content and semiotic systems. Genosko identifies the beginning of this discourse to around 1940 with the work of the information theorist Claude Shannon and his interest in both abstract and concrete mathematical machines. Genosko develops a critique of informatics and the coding of ‘signifying semiotics by asignifying semiotics (as) the growth of asignification […]’ Through selected works by Guattari, he provides a reading of the non-discursive through the machinic and ‘[…] non-human assemblages of proto-enunciation’.

The current Digital Turn could be seen as both a blessing and a curse. It certainly endows the architect with ever more powerful tools, not just for mapping and designing, but also for literally (not literally) expanding our sensorium. An expansion of the range of action/perception capacitates the body. But there are also worrisome indications that the Digital Turn perpetuates the unfortunate structuralist habit of putting the cart of representation before the horse of morphogenesis. In his contribution ‘How to Think Constructivism? Ruskin, Spuybroek and Deleuze on Gothic Architecture’, Piotrek Swiatkowski counters this tendency by reference to (neo)vitalist ontology. It is quite plausible – despite all the evidence to the contrary – that the twenty-first century will have to break with abstract concreteness (rationality) and recover the richness of concrete abstraction (pan-empiricism). The proposal is not to be taken lightly in an era of privatising profits and socialising losses. As Deleuze remarks in an interview with Toni Negri:

What we most lack is a belief in the world, we’ve quite lost the world, it’s been taken from us. If you
believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume.  

What We Cannot Speak about

We Must Not Pass Over in Silence

In contemporary readings of Spinoza on bodies and their capacity to affect and be affected, we agree with Deleuze that it is necessary to understand that there are many bodies: individual, collective, mystical, corporate, institutional, animal, even the body of the world and the heavens. And so there is a kind of indetermination and non-sense required for there to be thought processes of ‘determinational’ or ‘lines of flight’: symptoms, not codes, nor ‘spaces of affect’ understood in contrast to ‘effecting space’. Seigworth, in his paper ‘Affect Theory as Pedagogy of the “Non-”’, points to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s immanence as a ‘third knowledge (following ‘affectio’ or the capacity to affect and be affected as first knowledge, and common notions of relations [affectus] as the second)’. Referring to Guattari, Seigworth identifies the difference between ‘sensory’ and ‘problematic’ affect: the former arrives at the inside of being, the latter outside it. Citing Guattari: ‘affect’s spatio-temporal congruence dissolves and its elucidating procedures threaten to fly off in all directions.’

Experience is a single plane of immanence that fully integrates both subject and object, or as James would have it, there is no knower and known, there is only experience. Consequently, Truth and Falsity cannot be considered as values which exist outside the constitutive problematic fields that endow them with sense (Problem). This also marks the difference between detached interpretation and hands-on intervention. Consider Gregory Bateson’s example of a man felling a tree with an axe. An average Westerner would say ‘I cut down the tree’ strongly believing that there is a delimited agent (self) which performed a ‘purposive’ action (cutting) upon a delimited object (tree) What he fails to apprehend is the (open) whole:

Each stroke of the axe is modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree left by the previous stroke. This self-corrective […] process is brought about by a total system, tree-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke-tree; and it is this total system that has the characteristics of immanent mind. More correctly, we should spell the matter out as: (differences in tree) - (differences in retina) - (differences in brain) - (differences in muscles) - (differences in movement of axe) - (differences in tree), etc. What is transmitted around the circuit is transforms of differences. And, as noted above, a difference which makes a difference is an idea or unit of information.

The Proustian apprenticeship in asignifying semiotics taught us that there are two ways to miss the sense of a sign: objectivism and subjectivism. The former characterises the belief that sense can be found in the object emitting the sign, while the latter finds sense within, in ‘chains of association’ (the subject). In contrast to phenomenology, where the problem of the construction of signs becomes a problem of ‘bestowal of meaning’, in Deleuze’s account it is sense that is productive of signs and their meanings. This distinction between sense and meaning is not purely academic nitpicking, as the feminist philosopher Claire Colebrook cautions: ‘Sense is that orientation or potential that allows for the genesis of bodies but that always, if extended, would destroy the bordered organism.’ This in turn means that we do not look on and grasp a specific aspect of the world as detached and fully formed beings: ‘[A] being is what it is because it is already an expression of every aspect of the whole. […] Organisms are possible because they concretely embody potentialities – the power to eat, to see, to move, to think – that could have been actualized differently, and that can even be counter-actualized.’ According to Colebrook, a (fully) bounded organism is but an organicist fantasy. So is bounded architecture, and that is why it would
make more sense to treat it as a (semi-permeable) membrane(s) or in terms of zones and thresholds. In his celebrated *Cyclonopedia*, the speculative realist Reza Negarestani explains why closure (of any system or subject) is impossible and why the effectuation of this impossibility is always catastrophically unpleasant for the subject:

You can erect yourself as a solid and molar volume, tightening boundaries around yourself, securing your horizon, sealing yourself off from any vulnerability [...] immersing yourself deeper into your human hygiene and becoming vigilant against outsiders. Through this excessive paranoia, rigorous closure and survivalist vigilance, one becomes an ideal prey for the radical outside and its forces.

To conclude, experience is never of something, it *is* something and, as such, irreducible to what we call lived experience. The main consequence of such a revelation, according to Evans, is that goal-oriented human action cannot in any serious way be used as a design criterion because ‘freedom of action is never a *de facto* established condition but always a nascent possibility’. Put differently, not all potentiality is an accrued value. Consequently, the part-sign is antecedent to the signifying sign and not the other way around. This discovery sheds new light on the role of theory. To put it succinctly, meaning is not a matter of propositional logic, but of action. To avoid any misunderstandings, the signifying sign is just not abstract enough. In the 1960s, the American artist Barnett Newman declared that: ‘Aesthetics is for art what ornithology is for birds.’ By analogy – and in the face of performative paradox – we want to conclude by proposing that architecture will cope just as well – if not better – in ignorance of linguistics.

**Epilogue**
In a recent paper, the sociologist and philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato cautions against limiting the attention of scholarly research to political economy, and invites us to enter the field of subjective economy. This politico-libidinal approach resonates with the feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti’s anti-messianic call to ‘operate from the belly of the beast’. The notion of asignifying semiotics, which plays a dominant role in contemporary capitalism, turns out to be indispensable in creating the very conditions for its political critique. It is not limited to the semiotics of mathematics, stock indices, money, accounting and computer codes, but includes the semiotics of music, art, architecture, cinematography, dance, and so on. What they all have in common is their repudiation of the hegemony of meta-languages. In contrast to the cardologic, they are non-representative, non-illustrative and non-narrative. The assemblage is powered and amplified by the ordologic asignifying semiotics which works within it. If in representationalism a signifier functions in the logic of discursive aggregates, then in asignification it functions in the ‘machinic of bodies without organs’.

In their contributions to this issue, both Genosko and Hetrick employ the work of Lazzarato in developing arguments on what has recently come to be discussed under the term ‘semiocapitalism’. In the case of Hetrick, this is achieved by reference to Lazzarato’s machinic devices and the effects of immaterial labour on the proto-subjective and autopoietic *haecceities*. With Genosko, semiocapitalism is also identified through immaterial labour and the ‘seizing effect’ this has on individual freedom.

The autonomy of the asignifying sign is paramount if a body – psyche, socius and environment – is to be defined, not by its form or by its organs and functions, but by its affect; that is to say, its capacity for affecting or being affected. In asignifying semiotics, signs work directly on material flows. They are not powerless as in signifying semiotics because their performance does not depend on the mediation (translation) of signification, denotation,
and representation. The ‘truth’ under this conception is solely a matter of production (transduction), not of adequation. There is no representation, only action – theoretical action and practical action.50

Asignifying semiotics operates regardless of whether it signifies something to someone. In his article ‘The Work of Art as Monument: Deleuze and the (After-) Life of Art’, Louis Schreel draws on the last chapter of What is Philosophy? to conceptualise the work of art as a paradoxical monument which does not commemorate a past but rather preserves itself in the absence of man. The vicious correlationist circle, whereby one can only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart, is broken.51 Instead of referring to other signs, asignifying signs work directly upon the real. ‘The rainbow of oxidation that blooms on the heated surface of a polished steel bar’52 is as good an example as ‘the dance of the torero and toro’.53 With the affective turn we abandon the semiotic register, since the linguistic distinction between sign and referent loses its relevance. More importantly, we shake off the bad habit of anthropocentrism in favour of becoming posthuman.54 Which, in the words of Seigworth, is ‘other than human, not anti-human but as an a-human-ness that nevertheless is, for us, only accessible in the oscillation of entry/exit of what-counts-as-human’.

Asignifying signs do not represent or refer to an already constituted dominant reality. Rather, they simulate and pre-produce a reality that is not yet there. Existence is not already a given, it is a stake in the experimental assemblages, be they scientific, political or artistic. This is a task for cartography, with a caveat that the transcendental must not be traced from the empirical.55 Its task is neither to create utopian theories for the future, nor to regress to the ‘better past’, but to extract different possibilities in the present in order to make new thinking possible; in order to tease out any emancipatory potential, given that, as Sven-Olov Wallenstein cautions, we have to remain at the same level of advancement as the most advanced capitalism.56 It is a risk worth taking, even if our ‘critique’ seems to become inseparable from its target (the beast). Deleuze and Guattari’s principle of asignifying rupture calls for relinquishing the tautological, and hence the trivial effort of tracing, in favour of creative mapping of this kind:

The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight, follows its “aparallel evolution” through to the end.57

Notes
3. Steven Shaviro, ‘Abstract: Discognition.’ <http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Discongnition%20Abstract.pdf> [accessed 23 March 2014] ‘Organisms are affective before they are cognitive, because they are systems for accumulating and dissipating energy, before they are systems for processing information. Where cognitive science and philosophy of mind have tended to assume that affect serves cognition, we should rather see cognition as a belated and occasional consequence of a more basic affectivity. There are important philosophical precedents for this line of argument. [...] All these approaches point to a primordial form of sentience that is non-intentional, non-correlational, and anoetic; and that is best described, in a positive sense, as autistic, affective, and aesthetic.’

5. Félix Guattari, ‘Towards a Micro-Politics of Desire’ in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics* (London: Penguin, [1975] 1984), pp. 87, 96. “[T]he semiotic fluxes are just as real as the material ones, and in a sense the material fluxes are just as semiotic as the semiotic machines. […] abstract machinism in some sense “precedes” the actualization of the diagrammatic conjunctions between the systems of signs and the systems of material intensities.”


9. Phenomenologically driven architecture was developed under the auspices of Christian Norberg-Schulz who reintroduced the ancient Roman (organicist) idea of the genius loci, ‘the spirit of a particular place’. Its main contemporary proponents are Juhani Pallasmaa, Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Steven Holl.

10. The fundamental thesis of empiricism is not that knowledge is derived from experience or that everything starts from the sensible, but that relations are external to their terms.


12. A vast quantity of experimental research in textbooks and handbooks is concerned with snapshot vision, fixed-eye vision, or aperture vision, and is not relevant to understanding ambulatory vision.

13. This did not prevent it from being excessively (mis) used in Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) research.

14. ‘Essential’ in the term quint-essential is a synonym for ‘elemental’. In pre-atomic theory, there were four ‘known’ elements or essences - Earth, Air, Fire and Water - and a putative fifth element (quinta essentia). The fifth element was believed to be superior to the others, and so, ‘quintessential’ has come to mean something that is superior.


19. Amodal perception is a term which describes the full perception of a physical structure when it is only partially perceived, for example a table will be perceived as a complete volumetric structure even if only part of it is visible. The internal volumes and hidden rear surfaces are perceived despite the fact that only the near surfaces are exposed to view, and the world around us is perceived as a surrounding void, even though only part of it is in view at any time.

21. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (ATP, 506-8), ‘the plane of organization’ is the actual arrangement of elements in empirically describable and historically determined configurations. ‘The plane of consistency’ is the virtual co-presence of all elements of a totality in their real force-potential (both individual and collective).

22. Movement is unthinkable as long as we confuse it with the space covered.


27. Robin Evans, *The Projective Cast: Architecture and Its Three Geometries* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995), p. xxxvi. See also Robin Evans, *Translation from Drawing to Buildings* (London: AA Documents 2, [1986] 2003), p.154. ‘Before embarking on the investigation of drawing’s role in architecture, a few more words might be spent on language; more particularly, on the common antilogy that would have architecture be like language but also independent of it. All things with conceptual dimension are like language, as all grey things are like elephants.’


29. Non-discursive social interaction precedes linguistic interaction by at least 200,000 years and the computer era by 199,950 years.

30. Instants in time and instantaneous magnitudes do not actually exist. An object in relative motion cannot have a determined relative position (for if it did, it could not be in motion), and so cannot have its motion fractionally dissected as though it does, as in the paradoxes.


32. \(\frac{1}{(3\times10^{16})}\) is a (very, very small) fraction of the electromagnetic spectrum that we detect and call ‘reality’. From: Howard C. Hughes, *Sensory Exotica: A World Beyond Human Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).

33. By morphogenesis we mean the production of (meta)stable structures out of material flows. Morphogenesis is derived from the Greek terms ‘morphe’ (shape/form) and ‘genesis’ (creation).


36. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*. See also Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*
Yet such paranoia is not consistent with its anticipated telos, which is the safeguarding of survival. The anticipated telos of the paranoia of living (living as paranoia) is defined by its attempt to stave off life as that which is radically exterior and that which cannot be possessed by living or captured by vitalism. Therefore, the paranoia of living or survival is characterized by its duplicity in regard to its vitalistic intention: this paranoia simultaneously secures existence from the exteriority of life and repels life or the source of its vitality because life is radically exterior to the living being and fundamentally detrimental to its vitality. To put it succinctly, the duplicity of living as paranoia is defined by its simultaneously (economical) openness and closure toward life.


42. Jacques Derrida has voiced a concern with the ‘metaphysics of presence’ thesis, which he regards as central to the history of Western philosophy. It posits that the subject can be self-understanding and can express itself fully in speech.

43. Freud describes psychoanalysis as the last of three Copernican revolutions, or of three major blows to human narcissism. Copernicus demonstrated that the earth was not the centre of the universe, and Darwin’s theory of evolution dethrones man from his privileged place in creation. Psychoanalysis then delivers the most wounding blow of all: the discovery of the unconscious reveals that the ego is not master in its own house. According to Lacan, Freud’s Copernican revolution calls into question the entire humanist tradition, with its emphasis on the centrality of the conscious subject and the ego, bycentring the subject and demonstrating that it is governed by forces outside its conscious control.


45. Maurizio Lazzarato, “Exiting Language”, Semiotic Systems and the Production of Subjectivity in Félix

Biographies

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